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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ALEXANDER GOMEZ, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. : Case No. 980239-CA 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE : Priority No. 15 
DISTRICT, THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff, a student at Salt Lake Community College (SLCC) 
when the cause of action arose, brings this appeal from a 
judgment (R. 578-80) entered on a jury verdict favoring SLCC in a 
negligence action brought in the Third Judicial District Court 
(R. 1-4). Jurisdiction lies within this Court under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996), as the case was poured over from the 
Supreme Court of Utah by order dated April 28, 1998. 
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue in this case is whether the district court 
abused its discretion in precluding the testimony of plaintiff's 
proposed expert witnesses. In determining whether the preclusion 
of expert testimony constitutes reversible error, the Supreme 
Court of Utah has held that !l[t]he trial court has wide 
discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, 
and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
standard. Under this standard, we will not reverse unless the 
decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." State v. Larsen, ^ 
865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). Further, 
trial judges are to be given a wide measure of 
discretion in determining whether a particular witness 
qualifies as an expert. Trial courts are accorded this * 
discretion because they are "in the best position to 
assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a 
sense of the proceeding as a whole." 
Butler, Crockett and Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline 
Operating Co.. 909 P.2d 225, 233 (Utah 1995) (quoting State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)) (citations omitted). 
Finally, under rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
exclusion of evidence cannot be grounds for disturbing an order 
or judgment unless the reviewing court finds that substantial 
injustice would otherwise result. 
i 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
and rules pertinent to the issue before the Court for decision is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
Below 
Plaintiff brought suit against SLCC on May 15, 1996 (R. 1- ^ 
4), alleging negligence in SLCC's use, for a beginning basketball 
class, of a gymnasium facility that provided limited clearance 
2 
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behind a cross-court basketball backboard. The complaint 
survived SLCC's motion for summary judgment (R. 170-78) and was 
set for trial. Plaintiff and SLCC each filed a motion in limine, 
supported by a memorandum, seeking to bar the other party's use 
of expert testimony (R. 466-71 (plaintiff); R. 261-91 and 366-96 
(SLCC)); both motions were granted (R. 558-59 (plaintiff); 
R. 560-62 (SLCC)). The case was tried to a jury on October 
22-24, 1997 (R. 507-09), which returned a unanimous verdict in 
favor of SLCC (R. 553-55 and 509), attributing no negligence or 
proximate causality to SLCC but finding plaintiff's injuries 
proximately caused by his own negligence. The court entered 
judgment on this verdict on December 18, 1997 (R. 578-81), and 
plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal on January 16, 1998 
(R. 582-83). Receiving the notice of appeal on January 22, 1998 
(R. 589), the supreme court ordered it poured over to this Court 
some three months later (R. 592) for disposition. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
In October, 1994, plaintiff attended the first session of a 
beginning basketball class held at an SLCC gymnasium (R. 2, % 7). 
Plaintiff had previously taken the class at a different SLCC 
facility (R. 192), but believed he would receive additional class 
credit for repeating it (R. 193). Although he was not registered 
for the class, he was on a waiting list (R. 194) . The 
instructor, a substitute, verified that plaintiff was on the 
waiting list and indicated that the class had space available 
3 
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(R. 195). After having the students stretch, warm up, and "shoot 
around," the instructor divided the class into four teams for 
cross-court scrimmage games, with two teams on each cross-court 
(R. 198) . 
The cross-court on which plaintiff was playing had two feet 
of clearance behind the basket's backboard (R. 209, 1 4). 
Attached to the lower portion of the wall behind the backboard 
was a heating unit (R. 2, % 7) which reduced the clearance by 
four-and-a-half inches to one foot, seven-and-a-half inches 
(R. 209, H 4). In the course of the scrimmage, plaintiff 
attempted a lay-up shot and accelerated into the wall (R. 205-
06), hitting his knee on the wall or the attached heating unit 
and sustaining injury (R. 2, % 7). This lawsuit followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court has broad discretion over the admissibility 
of expert testimony. If the court's decision falls within the 
limits of reasonability, an appellate court will not overturn it. 
Only if no reasonable person would adopt the trial court's view 
is its decision vulnerable to challenge. 
Rather than showing the grounds of the court's ruling to be 
flawed, plaintiff merely recycles the arguments he advanced 
unsuccessfully below. By failing to demonstrate error in the 
court's reasoning, his argument falls short of articulating a 
viable challenge to the result. Moreover, by neglecting to 
4 
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marshal the evidence supporting the ruling, plaintiff has neither 
provided this Court with a basis for reasoned decision-making nor 
established that his substantial rights have been violated. Rule 
61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure consequently forbids 
disturbing the trial court's evidentiary ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PERMISSIVE LANGUAGE OF UTAH R. EVID. 702 DOES 
NOT MANDATE THE ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY WHERE 
CONFUSION AND UNFAIR PREJUDICE ARE LIKELY TO RESULT. 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that " [i]f 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, [sic] may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." The permissive 
language of the rule gives the trial court wide discretion to 
determine both whether a witness is qualified to give testimony 
on particular subject matter and whether the proposed testimony 
will be helpful to the jury. See Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 
746 (Utah App. 1991) ("The trial court has discretion to 
determine the admissibility of expert testimony, and to determine 
if the witness is qualified to give an opinion on a particular 
matter"); see also Dikeou v. Osborn. 881 P.2d 943, 947-48 (Utah 
App. 1994) (applying the Anton standard). In fact, "' [t]he 
exercise of discretion . . . necessarily reflects the personal 
5 
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judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find 
abuse only if . . . no reasonable [person] would take the view 
adopted by the trial court.'" State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 340 
(Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 
1978) ) . 
In the October 22, 1997 hearing on the parties' pretrial 
motions in this case, the district court judge made clear that he 
was granting SLCC's motion to exclude the testimony of 
plaintiff's proposed expert witnesses "upon each and every basis 
and analysis that is set forth in the Defendant's Memorandum in 
Support of their [sic] Motion in Limine. And the court is 
adopting the analysis and the authorities set forth therein as 
its ruling" (R. 602 (Tr. 6)J.1 While acknowledging that there 
were many reasons to exclude the testimony, the judge cited, as 
the primary basis for his decision, his lack of conviction that 
the experts' "proposed testimony satisfies the requirement in 
[rule 702] that their testimony would be helpful and would assist 
the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining 
any fact in issue" (id.). Under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence,2 he also found a likelihood that the jury would become 
^LCC's motion and memorandum are attached at the end of 
this brief as, respectively, Addendum A and Addendum B. \ 
2Rule 4 03 states, "Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. \ 
6 
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confused by the blurring of distinctions between instructing a 
basic physical education class and, for example, coaching 
competitive college basketball--the basis of proposed witness 
Roger Reid's expertise. See R. 603 (Tr. 7). (A similar 
potential for confusion is presented by a blurring of 
distinctions between instruction of physical education classes at 
the collegiate level and the organization of general recreational 
opportunities for children aged four through 18 years, the basis 
of the other witness' proposed testimony. See affidavit of Dee 
Oldroyd at R. 283-84). The judge concluded that "because it 
doesn't meet the helpfulness requirement in this court's opinion, 
and the problems with [Utah R. Evid.] 403" (R. 603 (Tr. 7)), the 
testimony must be excluded. 
Plaintiff fails to address his argument to the basis for the 
district court's decision. Instead, he charges that the 
exclusion of his expert witnesses improperly "tilted the playing 
field decidedly in favor of the defendants" (Brief of Appellant 
at 10), "destroyed the plaintiff's cause of action against the 
instructor" (id. at 8), and improperly turned the case into "a 
standard premises liability action" (id. at 7). Notably, 
plaintiff's jury instructions, filed a day before SLCC's, 
contained three requested instructions on the issue of premises 
liability which were given by the trial judge at plaintiff's 
behest. See R. 432-35. Also notably, the complaint in this case 
neither names the instructor as a defendant nor articulates a 
7 
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claim against him. Instead, it accuses SLCC, the sole defendant, 
of placing the backboard too close to the wall, installing the 
heating unit in a location dangerous to players, failing to 
provide padding, conducting physical education classes in this 
allegedly dangerous facility, failing to supervise its employees, 
and otherwise failing to use reasonable care (see Complaint at 
R. 2-3, U 8a-f). As the court properly found, the proposed 
testimony of plaintiff's excluded experts would not have assisted 
the jurors in understanding the evidence or determining the facts 
relevant to his stated claims. 
Plaintiff relies on State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 
1993), for the proposition that expert testimony may be helpful, 
and is consequently admissible under rule 702, even if the 
subject is not beyond the comprehension or experience of the < 
jurors (see Brief of Appellant at 6-7). In Larsen, a securities 
fraud prosecution, the issue presented to the appellate court was 
whether the testimony of a securities expert as to the i 
materiality of information that Larsen failed to disclose to 
investors should have been excluded because it expressed a legal 
conclusion. The supreme court, noting that "we will not reverse I 
unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability" (Larsen, 
865 P.2d at 1361), affirmed the lower court in permitting the 
testimony. However, it qualified its affirmance, in light of its < 
limited scope of review, as follows: 
We do not suggest that the trial court must allow 
expert testimony regarding materiality, especially 
i 
8 
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testimony utilizing the term "material." We simply 
hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in allowing the limited testimony in this case. 
We also note that an integral element of a rule 
702 determination to admit expert evidence is a 
balancing of the probativeness of the evidence against 
its potential for unfair prejudice. This balancing 
mimics that under rule 403 and is necessary to a 
determination of "helpfulness." In the present case, 
Larsen did not specifically object to the use of 
"material" on the ground that the probative value of 
the usage was substantially outweighed by the potential 
for unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. See 
Utah R.Evid. 4 03. Larsen's objections, although citing 
to rule 702, addressed only the contention that 
materiality in general was not a proper subject for 
expert testimony. Trial counsel must state clearly and 
specifically all grounds for objection. See Utah 
R.Evid. 103(a)(1). Inasmuch as Larsen failed to assert 
a claim of prejudice at the trial court, that issue is 
not properly preserved for appeal. If Larsen had made 
such an objection, it might have merited serious 
consideration by the trial court. 
Id. at 1363, n.12 (citation omitted). This qualifying language 
suggests that neither a ruling to allow the testimony nor a 
decision to exclude it would have been an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion because either outcome would have been within 
the limits of reasonability. Larsen simply honors the principle 
that a single set of circumstances may give rise to more than one 
reasonable result. It does not support plaintiff's expansive 
interpretation of rule 702 as mandatory rather than permissive, 
entitling him to use expert testimony irrespective of its 
potential for unfair prejudice and confusion. 
Moreover, the judge's determination in plaintiff's case, 
unlike that in Larsen, rests squarely on both rule 702 and rule 
403. In the hearing on the pretrial motions, the judge mirrored 
9 
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the language of rule 702 in holding that the proposed testimony 
would not "assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence 
or in determining any fact in issue" (R. 602 (Tr. 6)). He also 
referred directly to "the problems with 403" (id. at 603 (Tr. 7)) 
in his evaluation of the potential for jury confusion. As the 
Larsen footnote suggests, Larsen does not stand as precedent for 
plaintiff here to obtain reversal of the trial court's ruling 
without demonstrating that the excluded testimony, even if 
permissible, would have been more probative than prejudicial 
under rule 403--a showing he has not made. 
Plaintiff attempts to bolster the need for expert testimony 
by asserting that 
[i]n order to teach at the collegiate level, 
instructors must obtain a certain level of knowledge 
and experience. Teachers must be certified to have 
classroom education and on the job training through 
student teaching. That knowledge and experience 
appropriately set the standard of care for the conduct 
to be followed in a classroom, or in this case, 
gymnasium, setting. The trial court was in error by 
finding that the testimony of experienced basketball 
instructors would not "assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue." 
Brief of Appellant at 8. Plaintiff not only neglected to raise 
the issue of appropriate training and certification below, but 
failed to challenge SLCC's assertion that "[t]here is no 
requirement for substitute instructors in beginning basketball at 
Salt Lake Community College that instructors have any specialized 
or professional basketball training. [Substitute instructor] 
Carlson qualified simply because he has a college degree and is 
10 
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familiar with primary basketball skills being taught in this 
class" (R. 268-69 and 373-74) . Moreover, appellant does not 
appreciate that his proposed witnesses are not experienced 
basketball instructors familiar with the requisite standards for 
teaching a college-level basketball class and therefore do not 
possess the attributes he suggests would qualify them to testify 
on this issue. 
While the trial court judge did not dwell on the 
qualifications of plaintiff's proposed expert witnesses, SLCC 
argued in the memorandum supporting its motion in limine, as 
adopted by the court, that the witnesses were not qualified to 
testify as to standards applicable to college physical education 
instruction. The memorandum notes that neither witness had been 
involved in a college teaching setting nor had any specialized 
knowledge, training, or experience germane to such a setting 
(R. 271 and 376). The record further shows that in addition to 
never having taught college basketball, plaintiff's proposed 
expert witnesses had never evaluated a gymnasium for 
reasonableness of layout nor were aware of any standards 
governing court layout for college basketball classes (see 
R. 265-66 and citations contained therein; R. 370-71 and 
citations contained therein). One witness acknowledged that his 
evaluation was not based on any particular standards (see R. 265 
and citations contained therein; R. 370 and citations contained 
therein), and the other admitted that his opinion was nothing 
11 
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more than the application of a "reasonable man" standard (see 
R. 266 and citations contained therein; R. 371 and citations 
contained therein). 
The Supreme Court of Utah, in Steffensen v. Smith's 
Management Corp., specifically approved this Court's declaration 
in Davidson v. Prince that "'an expert generally cannot give an 
opinion as to whether an individual was "negligent" because such 
an opinion would require a legal conclusion.1" Steffensen v. 
Smith's Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1348 (Utah 1993), 
(quoting Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App. 
1991)). As the Steffensen court explained, "Opinion testimony is 
not helpful to the fact finder when it is couched as a legal 
conclusion. These extreme expressions of the general belief of 
the expert witness tend to blur the separate and distinct < 
responsibilities of the judge, jury, and witness." Steffensen, 
862 P.2d at 1347-48. Yet by their own deposition testimony, 
plaintiff's experts admitted having nothing more than their < 
general beliefs and conclusions of negligence to offer. 
Roger Reid stated that his role was to "just look and give 
my opinion about would this be a safe situation to play I 
basketball in. Do you feel like it's a safe environment, do you 
feel like a young man in this setting did have the clearance to 
play the game and could this help result in an injury" (R. 276 i 
and 381). Asked whether he knew of any published standards 
governing the layout of a gym for beginning-level college 
12 
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basketball classes, he opined that "whatever facility they have 
there would be what you would use" (R. 279 and 384) and noted 
that he had observed basketball played in facilities "from the 
most plush to gyms that didnft even have nets on them where they 
played organized basketball" (id.). Dee Oldroyd twice testified 
that in concluding SLCCfs facility was dangerous for cross-court 
play, he was applying only his own understanding of 
reasonableness (see R. 290-91 and 395-96), which was not based on 
any governing standards or rules; in fact, he conceded, "I've 
never really seen any written material discussing cross-court 
play" (R. 289 and 394). The proposed witnesses' sweeping 
conclusions, based on no more than common experience, overreach 
the province of the jury as fact finder. 
Plaintiff has not shown that the act of negligently 
colliding with a wall is beyond the comprehension or common 
experience of the jurors. Nor has he shown that the information 
possessed by his proposed experts would have assisted the jurors 
in determining a contested fact or understanding the evidence, as 
rule 702 requires. For these reasons, he has failed to 
demonstrate abuse in the court's decision to exclude their 
testimony. Because the decision was within the limits of 
reasonableness and therefore within the bounds of the trial 
court's discretion, it is entitled to this Court's affirmance. 
13 
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II. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE FINDINGS THAT UNDERLIE THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S RULING. 
Plaintiff cannot successfully challenge the court's ruling 
on SLCC's motion in limine without challenging the factual 
findings that underlie it. To challenge to these findings, 
plaintiff must marshal the evidence in their support. Only by 
showing the findings to be nonetheless so lacking in support as 
to be clearly against the weight of the evidence can plaintiff 
establish error in the trial court's decision. See Robb v. 
Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1327-28 (Utah App. 1993). As this Court 
has explained, 
To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of 
fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 
"[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the 
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's 
position. In order to properly discharge the 
[marshaling] duty . . ., the challenger must present, 
in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced [in court] which supports 
the very findings the appellant resists." Once 
appellants have established every pillar supporting 
their adversary's position, they then "must ferret out 
a fatal flaw in the evidence" and show why those 
pillars fail to support the trial court's findings. 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 
1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 and 1314 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citations omitted) (first three alterations in original)). 
Moreover, as the Court has recently held, it is insufficient to 
discharge the marshaling duty "by quoting each finding of fact 
14 
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and then stating the evidence against it." Harper v. Summit 
County, No. 961486-CA, slip op. 17 (Utah App. July 23, 1998). 
Plaintiff has failed to meet even the flawed standard to 
which Harper refers. Instead of addressing "each and every basis 
and analysis" (R. 602 (Tr. 6)) contained in SLCCfs memorandum 
supporting its motion in limine, plaintiff has ignored the facts 
cited by SLCC--and adopted by the court--to show that the 
proposed expert witnesses lacked knowledge and experience in the 
conduct of a beginning collegiate basketball class, in standards 
for appropriate layout of the physical facility, and in rules 
governing instructional cross-court play (see R. 265-66 and 
citations contained therein; R. 370-71 and citations contained 
therein). Plaintiff has not addressed or shown erroneous the 
fact that at SLCC, substitute instructors in beginning basketball 
are not required to have any specialized or professional training 
in the sport (see R. 268-69 and 373-74). He has not challenged 
the fact that the statements of plaintiff's proposed expert 
witnesses are nothing more than their own application of common-
sense experience to the reasonableness of SLCC's actions (see 
R. 271 and 376). 
Even if he were able to manifest error, plaintiff carries 
the further burden of proving that the error is so fraught with 
consequences as to be "inconsistent with substantial justice" 
under rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, thereby 
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permitting the Court to disturb the judge's order.3 He attempts 
to meet this burden by claiming that the effect of permitting the 
testimony of SLCC's substitute and assigned instructors "was to 
allow the defense to have expert testimony presented to the jury 
without the plaintiff having the opportunity to present rebuttal 
testimony" (Brief of Appellant at 9). However, he concedes that 
the testimony of these fact witnesses "was, of course, material, 
relevant, and proper" (id.), and cites no testimony that strayed 
from a necessary factual account of the witnesses' personal 
knowledge of and participation in the events surrounding 
plaintiff's injury. Moreover, he has identified no objection of 
record, on grounds of improper expert testimony, to the sworn 
statements of these fact witnesses below. He also neglects to 
mention the court's exclusion of all testimony, both factual and 
expert, by SLCC's sole designated expert witness, Bill Marcroft. 
See R. 603-04 (Tr. 7-8) re expert testimony; R. 612-13 (Tr. 16-
17) re fact testimony; see also R. 558-59, Order Granting 
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine. The trial court precluded all 
3Rule 61 states, 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect 
in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the 
parties, is ground for granting a new trial 
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to 
the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect 
in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
16 
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expert testimony by both parties. Contrary to plaintiff's 
representation (see Brief of Appellant at 10), the "playing 
field" was level. Under these circumstances, plaintiff has not 
established that the court's decision adversely affected his 
substantial rights, as rule 61 requires. 
This Court has explained that "[t]he deference we afford to 
trial courts' findings is based on and fosters the principle that 
traditional fact finders, whether judges or juries, are better 
equipped to consider, weigh, and assess the evidence that 
litigants bring before the courts." Oneida Cold Storage, 872 
P. 2d at 1053. Because the appellate court does not sit to retry 
the facts, 
[s]uccessful challenges to findings of fact thus must 
demonstrate to appellate courts first how the trial 
court found the facts from the evidence and second why 
such findings contradict the weight of the evidence. 
These demonstrations in appellants' briefs not only 
avoid retrying the facts but also assist us in our 
decision-making and opinion-writing, thus increasing 
our efficiency. 
Id. Plaintiff's failure to marshal the evidence with respect to 
the findings on which the court's exclusion of expert testimony 
is based, coupled with the absence of a showing of substantial 
injustice under rule 61, requires affirmance of the district 
court's order granting SLCC's motion in limine. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has neglected his duty to marshal the evidence on 
which the trial court's preclusion of expert testimony rests. 
17 
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Nonetheless, he reargues his case as if the standard of review 
were de novo. Because the applicable standard is abuse of the 
considerable discretion vested in the trial court as to the 
admissibility of expert testimony, plaintiff's argument is 
misdirected. His failure to address the factual basis of the 
court's ruling is fatal to his appeal. 
Plaintiff's failure to marshal the evidence in support of 
the trial court's ruling is, by itself, a sufficient ground for 
rejection of his appeal. However, even if plaintiff had met his 
marshaling requirement, his argument founders on the merits. He 
has not shown that the proposed testimony of his expert witnesses 
would have assisted the jury in understanding the evidence or 
determining a disputed fact pursuant to rule 702, nor has he 
established that the testimony would have been more probative 
than prejudicial under rule 403. Because he has not shown the 
district court's preclusion of the testimony to be outside the 
bounds of reasonability, his appeal cannot succeed. 
For these reasons, as more fully explained above, defendant, 
Salt Lake Community College, respectfully requests the Court to 
affirm the decision of the court below. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Defendant does not believe oral argument is necessary to the 
proper disposition of this appeal, but desires to participate if 
oral argument is ordered by the Court. Defendant also believes 
18 
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the law on admissibility of expert testimony to be sufficiently 
clear that a published opinion is not needed in this case. 
Dated this 14/. day of August, 1998. 
/7. I. 
NANCY Lt KEM 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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RAYMOND A. HINTZE (1501) 
J. WESLEY ROBINSON (6321) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
P.O. Box 140856 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0124 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALEXANDER GOMEZ : DEFENDANT SALT LAKE COMMUNITY 
: COLLEGE'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY : Case No. 960903291 
COLLEGE DISTRICT, THE : 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Defendant. : Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant, Salt Lake Community College, by and through 
Raymond A. Hintze, Assistant Attorney General, moves the Court for 
an order excluding the testimony of Plaintiff's witnesses, Roger 
Reid and Dee Oldroyd, on the grounds that said witnesses are not 
properly qualified as experts and further, that expert testimony is 
not necessary or admissible on the issue of negligence or standard 
of care because there are no technical complexities involved in 
this determination and opinion testimony on this subject is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
improper. This motion is supported by a memorandum filed herewith. 
DATED this l(? day of £#f / 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DEFENDANT SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE'S MOTION IN LIMINE, 
postage prepaid, this |(j?*^  day of October, 1997, to the 
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MARK D DUNN 
ROBERT J DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
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RAYMOND A. HINTZE (1501) 
J. WESLEY ROBINSON (6321) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
P.O. Box 140856 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0124 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALEXANDER GOMEZ 
Plaintiff, 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE DISTRICT, THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT SALT LAKE COMMUNITY 
COLLEGES' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION IN 
LIMINE 
Case No. 960903291 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant, Salt Lake Community College, submits the following 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of its motion in 
limine: 
FACTS 
This case is brought by the Plaintiff, a student at Salt Lake 
Community College and is based upon an incident occurring in a 
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beginning basketball course at the South City Campus, formerly 
South High School, On the day of the accident the class was being 
taught by Kenneth Carlson, a substitute teacher. The issue 
presented by Plaintiff's case is whether the instructor was 
negligent in directing the students to play cross-court on the side 
baskets in the gymnasium when the backboards were fixed to brick 
walls allowing only approximately two (2) feet clearance between 
the backboard and the brick wall. 
WITNESS ROGER REID 
Roger Reid's credentials, as set forth in his deposition, are 
as follows: 
He has never taught college basketball. (Dep. at 4). He has 
never been qualified as an expert witness in any proceeding. He 
has never been asked to evaluate a gym for reasonableness of layout 
before. (Dep. at 18). He has never done any research on basketball 
court design. (Dep. at 9). He has never had any experience with 
basketball court design. (Dep. at 10). He is not aware of any 
national standards governing basketball court layout for college 
gym classes (Dep. at 12 and 13). 
Mr. Reid's experience as a professional college basketball 
coach has no bearing whatsoever on his ability to evaluate 
standards applicable to college physical education classes. His 
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opinion in this case is simply based upon a reasonable man standard 
and his own experiences and what he has seen. (Dep. at 26). 
WITNESS PEE QLDRQYP 
Dee Oldroyd is a graduate of Brigham Young University in 
Recreation Management Administration and worked in Korea from 1987 
to 1993, organizing activities in soccer, football and basketball 
for four to eighteen year olds. (Dep. at 4 and 5). His only 
experience is working with high school age children in football and 
basketball. (Dep. at 6 and 7). He has never served as an 
instructor in a physical education basketball class. (Dep. at 7). 
He has no certificate or credentials as an expert. He has never 
been qualified as an expert witness in a court proceeding. (Dep. at 
8). He has never been asked to evaluate a gym or give expert 
opinions on gym layout. (Dep. at 25) . He has never advertised or 
held himself as an expert witness. (Dep. at 8). He has never 
published any articles, papers or books and does not belong to any 
professional organizations. (Dep. at 11) . He is not aware of any 
standards which apply to college physical education classes. (Dep. 
at 18). Most importantly, he admits his opinions are based simply 
upon a reasonable man standard. (Dep. at 26 and 28). 
3 
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ARGUMENT 
The issue presented by this case is whether the instructor of 
this particular physical education class, in which Plaintiff was 
injured, was negligent in instructing the participants to play 
cross-court in a gymnasium where the baskets and backboards were 
anchored to the gymnasium walls, allowing approximately two (2) 
feet between the backboard and the wall. The risk of injury and 
the issue of negligence in this case is merely whether it would be 
foreseeable that such condition would create an unreasonable risk 
of injury from collision of the players. 
The standard of care "applied" in a case is an issue of law 
decided upon by the trial judge. The trial judge must also decide 
whether a particular expert is qualified and whether particular 
testimony would be helpful or suitable in a case. Ostler v. Albina 
Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445, 447 (Ut.App. Ct. 1989). 
Normally, the reasonable man standard is employed, except in 
cases where the subject is highly technical or otherwise 
specialized in nature. In such a case, the standard of care is 
that which reasonable persons of comparable or like .skills would 
reasonably employ in the same or similar circumstances. See Pine 
Creek Canal No. 1 v. Stadler, 685 P.2d 13 (Wyo. 1984). In a 
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recent treatise on Utah Evidence Law by Professors Edward L. 
Kimball and Ronald N. Boyce, it states: 
Requirement of helpfulness. The rule requires 
that the expert not only have special 
qualifications, but that the expert's 
knowledge will "assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue." (citations omitted). That means 
it is inappropriate for an expert to testify 
only to matters of common sense or to matters 
of law, as to which the court will give 
instructions. (citations omitted). Utah 
Evidence Law, p. 7-4. 
* • * * 
Expert evidence required. If the jury cannot 
properly make a decision without the help of 
an expert's specialized knowledge, the court 
will require that expert testimony be 
presented. Generally expert testimony is 
required to establish the elements of a 
medical malpractice case. Id. at 7-5. 
Kenneth Carlson, the substitute instructor, had a Bachelor's 
degree in Economics, a minor in Communications and a Master's 
degree in Business. He had no specialized education in athletics 
and no professional training as a basketball coach. He played 
competitive high school basketball but was not involved in other 
competitive basketball training in college. He has had some 
volunteer experience coaching youth basketball and teaching primary 
basketball skills. There is no requirement for substitute 
instructors in beginning basketball at Salt Lake Community College 
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that instructors have any specialized or professional basketball 
training. Mr. Carlson qualified simply because he has a college 
degree and is familiar with primary basketball skills being taught 
in this class. 
This is not an issue which requires expert testimony because 
a reasonable man standard is the appropriate standard to be used. 
Allowing Plaintiff to bring in the aforementioned witnesses, who 
have expertise and experience far in excess of that necessary for 
Defendant's instructor, would clearly be improper. The primary 
purpose of expert testimony is to establish standards for the 
benefit of the trier of fact when the facts are somewhat alien in 
terminology and when technological complexities would preclude 
ordinary triers of fact from rendering intelligent judgment. See 
Juhnke v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, 634 P.2d 
1132 (Kan. 1981). The Supreme Court of Arizona properly concluded 
that negligence is not so susceptible of objective and accurate 
perception as to be the proper subject of opinion evidence. 
Dobbertin v. Johnson, 390 P.2d 839 (Az. 1964). The Utah Supreme 
Court in Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, 4 08 P.2d 18 6, 17 Ut.2d 221, 
stated "Opinion testimony is admissible only when subject matter is 
such that jury cannot be expected to draw correct inferences from 
6 
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the facts; there is no need for expert opinion with reference to 
facts involving common place occurrences." 
Stated in the affirmative, the Utah Supreme Court in Edwards 
v. Dickerson, 597 P.2d 1328, stated: "Where the subject of inquiry 
is a field beyond the knowledge general possessed by a layman, one 
properly qualified therein maybe permitted to testify to his 
opinion as an expert. Id. At 1330. 
In Davidson v. Prince, 813 P. 2d 1225, the Utah Court of 
Appeals considered a case wherein expert witness, Newell Knight, an 
accident reconstruction expert, was called to testify regarding a 
party's negligence. Opposing counsel objected when Mr. Knight was 
asked to express his opinion as to whether the defendant was 
negligent. The trial court sustained the objection and did not 
allow the testimony. Upon appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals held: 
The trial court's exclusion of this testimony, 
however, can be affirmed on the ground that it 
was a legal conclusion. Although Rule 704 
abolished the per se rule against testimony 
regarding ultimate issues of fact, it does not 
allow all opinions. "The Advisory Committee 
notes [to Rule 704] make it clear that 
questions which would merely allow the witness 
to tell the jury what result to reach are not 
permitted. Nor is the rule intended to allow 
a witness to give legal conclusions, 
(citations omitted) Id. at 1231. 
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The evidence offered by Plaintiff's witnesses Reid and Oldroyd 
does not fit within the proper subject of expert testimony. Their 
testimony is not based upon any specific scientific, technical or 
other data because both witnesses had denied either knowledge of 
any standards or their applicability to the specific situation. In 
each instance, these witnesses are simply being asked to testify 
that the decision of the instructor to allow these students to play 
cross-court under these circumstances was unreasonable. Neither of 
these witnesses offer any specialized knowledge, but are simply 
substituting their judgment for that of the Defendant and the jury. 
These witnesses have neither established by qualifications, 
training, or otherwise, any specialized knowledge applicable to 
college physical education classes because neither have been 
involved in a college teaching setting. Their testimonies are not 
based upon any standards, scientific or otherwise, but are merely 
statements of their own opinions as to the reasonableness of the 
conduct of the Defendant. As such, they must be excluded as 
improper expert testimony. 
In State v. Rimmasch, lib P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), the Supreme 
Court of Utah outlined the trial court's approach to determining 
whether expert witnesses' testimony should be allowed. If the 
scientific evidence falls within the category of "inherent 
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reliability" because the scientific techniques are so well known 
and understood by everyone, then the trial court may allow the 
evidence. However, if the scientific evidence does not qualify for 
judicial notice, then the court must be satisfied of an initial 
foundational showing that convinces the court that the principles 
or techniques underlying the proper testimony are accurate and 
reliable. The court should carefully explore each logical link in 
the chain that leads to the expert testimony given and determine 
it's reliability. In the absence of such a showing by the 
proponent of the evidence and a determination by the court as to 
it's threshold reliability, the evidence is inadmissible. Id at 
403. See also, State v. Crosby, 302 Utah Adv.Rep. 36 (Sup.Ct. 
October 29, 1996) . 
CONCLUSION 
This case is governed by a reasonable man standard and it is 
prejudicial to the Defendant to allow Plaintiff to offer testimony 
of Roger Reid and Dee Oldroyd, who have greater experiences than 
are required for the Defendant's instructor in this case. This 
case can be ruled on by the jury under a reasonable man standard. 
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the need for experts or that 
9 
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they would be helpful to the jury in arriving at a negligence issue 
in this case. 
Dated this 15th day of October, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
5ND A. 
WESLEY/ROBINSON 
assistant Attorneys General 
Litigation Division 
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1 just a little bit, then, if we could. Starting with 
2 high school graduation, what is your education? 
3 A After graduating from high school, I went 
4 to BYU for one year and then transferred to College 
5 of Eastern Utah, and then spent my last two years, 
6 graduated from Weber State College, and that's as far 
7 as my schooling. I took some classes — I went back 
8 to BYU to get my master's, and halfway through that, 
9 I was hired as the assistant basketball coach there. 
10 Q What was your degree in, Roger? 
11 A Physical education and physiology. 
12 Q Did you ever do any teaching of physical 
13 education at any level? 
14 A I did classes off and on in high school for 
15 seven years. 
16 Q And what classes were they? Basketball 
17 classes? 
18 A Not just basketball classes. They were all 
19 kinds of different activities that we performed, 
20 depending upon the time of the year. It might be 
21 volleyball, it might be Softball. It was just 
22 different activities. 
23 Q What high school was that? 
24 A I did at Payson High School and also at 
25 Clearfield High School. 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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all, and anybody else that plays the game, they would 
be trying to score a basket. 
Q What were you asked to do in this case as 
an expert witness? 
A Basically, just look at the setting, the 
environment, and be truthful in what I say, which I 
would be, anyway, and just look and give my opinion 
about would this be a safe situation to play 
basketball in. Do you feel like it's a safe 
environment, do you feel like a young man in this 
setting did have the clearance to play the game and 
could this help result in an injury. Basically that 
kind of a setting. 
Q I take it you've never done this task 
before in a case. 
A No, I have not. 
Q And did you, in fact, make that opinion? 
A Yes. I have told him I have never done 
this before. I have also mentioned to him on 
numerous occasions that I have basically seen every 
level of basketball and how it's played from running 
clinics to camps to dealing with young men from 
preschool up to college level. 
Q Now, you're aware that this gymnasium was 
once the South High School, aren't you? 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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1 advice on a situation and I didn't even know the 
2 circumstances of what it was all about, to be honest 
3 with you, and he said to me, you know, we plan on — 
4 I think on the second visit. I mean, I was just 
5 going to give my comments on what I felt, and then he 
6 asked me, you know, "Do you want to get paid?" And I 
7 said, "Well," you know, "do you usually pay people?" 
8 And he said, "Yeah, we do." And he said, "Well, what 
9 do we need to pay you?" And I said, "I could care 
10 less," to be honest with you. And then he said, 
11 well, so much an hour, or something like that. 
12 Q Do you remember what the rate is? 
13 A If I'm not mistaken, I think he said 
14 something like 90 something or 100 dollars or hour or 
15 something like that, I think he said. 
16 Q Do you know approximately how many hours 
17 you've put in on this case to date? 
18 A Well, by reading the materials that were 
19 sent to me, driving up and looking at the scene where 
20 the accident occurred, and today, probably — oh, I 
21 would say roughly six, seven hours, something like 
22 that. 
23 Q I take it you haven't ever done any 
24 research on basket court design at all, have you? 
25 A As far as me just doing research on it, no, 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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1 I have not. 
2 Q Do you belong to any professional 
3 basketball organizations? 
4 A Yes. I belong to the National Association 
5 of Basketball Coaches, In that context, I've served 
6 on many, many different committees. I'm also on the 
7 Basketball Congress, which is a — they had 20 
8 coaches picked across the country that represents 
9 college basketball coaches, and that's called the 
10 Basketball Congress Committee. 
11 Q In that capacity, have you done any work at 
12 all with respect to planning court design? 
13 A No, I have not. 
14 Q I take it that committee works with other 
15 standards and — 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q — rules and scheduling and all those kinds 
18 of things? 
19 A Right. 
20 Q Tell me what you were provided in this 
21 case, Roger, for your review. What have you read? 
22 A The depositions of the instructor that took 
23 over the class, Carlson; the athletic trainer, 
24 Vernon; and also a gentleman by the name of Ballard, 
25 I think his name was. I've read those. And also 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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1 A Well, I would think that — I've seen 
2 many — if you're teaching a class, it doesn't matter 
•3 if it's intermediate or beginning, there's usually a 
4 syllabus that would outline what you would do in that 
5 class. I've never seen anything as far as the 
6 structure of a gym. Usually it's just a facility 
7 that you're coaching at or you're teaching at, and 
8 whatever facility they have there would be what you 
9 would use. 
10 Q Okay. So there aren't any national 
11 standards that apply to gymnasium design for a 
12 basketball class? 
13 MR. GRAY: I would object to the question 
14 as misstating his testimony, but go ahead and answer. 
15 Q (BY MR. HINTZE) I'm not trying to 
16 misstate. I'm just asking a question about that. 
17 A I would say that there's so many different 
18 kinds of different facilities that I have seen in 
19 this country from the most plush to gyms that didn't 
20 even have nets on them where they played organized 
21 basketball. 
22 Q So I take it your answer is no, there 
23 J aren't any standards? 
24 I A Right. Well, let me just state that there 
25 | are standards as far as college basketball, NCAA. 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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There's standards there. And usually if you're 
talking about a standard high school gym that's being 
built; there's usually standards as far as the length 
and width of the court now, but a lot of facilities 
were built that I've been in way before that and so 
forth; but on the other hand; you know, to answer 
that question, to be honest; yes, there's dimensions 
for college courts and high school courts, if they 
were building new ones, for an example, or building 
courts, yeah. 
Q But those dimensions apply only for the 
competitive athletics, don't they? In other words, 
they aren't designed for gym classes, necessarily. 
The high school rule book has a dimension for courts 
so that all the courts are at least a standard size? 
A Right. 
Q But there's nothing that makes that 
applicable to gym classes, is there? 
A No. 
Q Thank you. How do you understand this 
accident occurred, Roger? 
A From looking at the scene itself and from 
reading over the depositions of what's been provided 
me, it looks like a young man was in a PE class, 
playing crosscourt on a basket and, through that 
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would hinder his ability to recognize that risk, are 
you? 
A Other than just the skill level that I can 
imagine in a class like that, what that handicap 
would be. 
Q Is your evaluation of this case simply 
based upon your overall experience in basketball and 
not based upon review of any standards or — 
A Right. What I basically am judging what 
I — is because of my experiences, dealing and 
coaching and working with young men and playing the 
game. My expertise — I mean, whatever expertise 
is. I mean, some people think you might be an expert 
basketball coach and some people don't think you know 
anything about it. But in my opinion, that's how — 
I've based my judgments on what I've seen, yeah. 
MR. HINTZE: That's all the questions I 
have. 
MR. GRAY: I have no questions. 
(Whereupon the taking of the deposition 
was concluded at 10:30 a.m.) 
* * * * 
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trying 
if you 
to ask vague or trick questions in any way, so 
don't understand the question, if it's 
inartfully framed, go ahead and tell me to rephrase 








can understand it. Okay? 
Okay. 
Would you state your full name for the 
Dee Victor Oldroyd. 
And your address? 
514 West 1120 North, Orem, Utah 84057. 
I want to first go into your background and 
qualifications to serve as an expert witness in this 
1 case. Do you have a resume or a curriculum vitae 




I have a resume. I didn't bring one. 
Okay. 
I sent one, I think, to Jordan's 
department. 
Q 
MR. GRAY: I don't have it. 
THE WITNESS: I did send one to them. 
(BY MR. HINTZE) Tell me just a little 
about your background and education, if you would, 
Dee. 
A I graduated from BYU with a recreation 
management administration degree. 1987, April, is 
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when I graduated. I was immediately hired, actually 
before I graduated, to work for the government as a 
civilian in government service as a sports director 
in Korea from 1987 to 1993, six-and-a-half years, 
somehow in there. I think it was early '97, late 
'93. 
Q Were you a civil servant? 
A Uh-huh. GS is what it's referred to. 
Q Okay. 
A And I did a number of things besides being 
a sports director, but that was my primary job. 
Prior to that, and one of the reasons the government 
wanted me was because I worked for the Utah County 
Youth Detention Center in Provo and I ran a lot of 
their recreational programs there in the safe and 
secure facility there in Provo. 
Q So what age — 
A That is 9 to 18. 
Q Okay. 
A In that place. 
Q And I guess in the military you had — 
A The military was primarily ages 4 to 18, 
but I did deal a lot with the soldiers, the military 
personnel. 
Q Tell me just briefly what you did in 
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Korea• 
A I mainly organized all the main sports of 
soccer, football, basketball. I was the football 
commissioner for Korea-wide, and that involved 
tournament play and play in and out of the country. 
I organized, for the first time, a baseball league 
that was with Korea and Japan, Soviet Union, before 
it was broken up. That was the Pacific Rim 
Championship for the pony league, 13, 14 year olds, a 
big to-do. But, anyway, that sort of stuff. 
Some of the side things that I dealt with 
were haunted houses, 4th of July carnivals, the 
community events on the base of Yongsan Garrison in 
Seoul, Korea, and I dealt with fitness centers and 
had a number of facilities, as well as ball fields, 
and we had to make sure that the youth in the 
military were able to get equal participation on 
these fields because they were in high demand. 
Q Have you ever worked in any school setting, 
high school or college? 
A High school, I'd have to say yes, even 
though I never was paid by the high school. I worked 
in a high school setting for the military in Korea. 
As the football commissioner, it was for the high 
school age kids, and I also dealt with basketball 
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program for high school age kids. 
Q That was, again, the interschool 
competitive leagues? 
A Correct, 
Q Ever had any experience as an instructor 
just in high school basketball PE classes? 
A No. 
Q And I guess for college age kids neither? 
A No. 
Q Do you have any other degrees or 
certificates that you've obtained? 
A Not completely. I have almost a master's 
degree in recreation management. It was paid half by 
the military and half by me while I was in Korea, but 
I ended up leaving the military before I was done. 
It was through the University of Oregon. 
Q Do you have any licenses or special 
certification or any professional accreditation at 
all? 
A The only thing I really would think would 
relate to this was I was certified through the 
National Sports Coaches Association to instruct and 
train coaches, and I did that for at least five years 
while in Korea. 
Q That was working with coaches rather than 
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1 with players? 
2 A Correct. And that was back during about 
3 the '88 to '93 time frame. 
4 Q Okay. Have you ever testified in a lawsuit 
5 before as an expert witness? 
6 A No. 
7 Q Approximately what percentage of your 
8 annual income is derived from expert opinions in 
9 cases? 
10 A Zero. This is the first time. 
11 Q This is the first case you've ever been 
12 employed for? 
13 A Uh-huh. 
14 Q So do you advertise your services as an 
15 expert witness in any way? 
16 A I haven't. 
17 Q Do you know how you got involved in this 
18 case? 
19 A The attorney is somehow related Jordan 
20 Christensen, knows me from college, high school, and 
21 knew that I had some experience in recreation and he 
22 called me and got my background and said, "I think 
23 you're," you know, "experienced enough that I'd like 
24 | to talk more." And so we did, and he said, "I think 
25 | you'd work out." 
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Q (BY MR. HINTZE) I said Mr. Gray because 
we're on the record. Off the record he's just Al. 
Okay? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. Now, tell me, when Mr. Gray hired 
you to be an expert witness, what did he ask you to 
do in the case? 
A Basically just to review the material. 
Asked my background, as you did alt the beginning, 
and then state my opinion of what I thought took 
place. 
Q Have you ever done this before? 
A No. 
Q Did you do what you were asked to do in the 
case? 
A I think so. We're in the process of that. 
Q Have you done anything beyond what you were 
asked to do? 
A No. 
Q In your evaluation, did you determine that 
there were some defects in the layout of the gym? 
A I think that those baskets are way too 
close to the wall, defect or not. I don't know 
exactly your definition of that, but I know that 
that's the issue here at hand. The heater causing, 
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we're talking about here in this accident. 
Q And I guess the results of that were just 
for your own benefit so you haven't published any 
other results of that research? 
A That's correct. Until we had the money or 
the bond or the sponsors to put together the facility 
and location, we couldn't proceed, even though all 
the other things are in place. 
Q Are there any professional organizations 
that you belong to? 
A No. I don't know if it's considered a 
professional organization, but right now I'm an 
investor and a company worker of a company called 
Sports Nuts, but that's, you know, just my current 
job right now. 
Q What does that involve? 
A It's a multilevel company that me and a few 
other people have started up back in October of '96. 
We officially started taking money and registration 
January 10th of '97, and it involves four lines of 
product, so to speak. One is a health line, one is 
apparel, equipment, and then the fourth one is 
collectibles, signature autographs from Mohammad Ali, 
Steve Young, and we're fully underway in that. 
Q That doesn't involve actual sports 
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1 A The regulations. And, again, I don't have 
2 these measurements off the top of my head that would 
3 apply to a regulation high school, college full court 
4 basketball gym. I've looked them over a number of 
5 times in the past and I would assume that they would 
6 have applied to a — 
7 Q You're just assuming they apply. Is there 
8 anything in the standards themselves that say that 
9 it's a violation of these standards to play 
10 crosscourt on a smaller court with lesser dimensions 
11 in any of the areas? 
12 A I've never really seen any- written material 
13 discussing crosscourt play. And if they varied on a 
14 regular full court play on the makeup of that gym, if 
15 they varied, then it wouldn't be in regulation. 
16 Q What is your understanding of how this 
17 accident happened? 
18 A It seems pretty clear as to how it 
19 happened, and I think the accident happened because 
20 there was full court or crosscourt play towards the 
21 baskets that were on the wall without enough room 
22 from underneath that backboard. 
23 Q You say you visited the site. 
24 A I did. 
25 Q is it fairly obvious to you as you enter 
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1 again, more of a physical problem to the facility. 
2 If the heater is — needs to be that close to the 
3 wall so the people up in the stands up above can see 
4 a full court game going on, then they need to be a 
5 different type of backboard, an adjustable one that 
6 moves, but, I mean, I — there was also some 
7 badminton rings or some kind of rings that held up a 
8 net or something on the wall that were maybe part of 
9 your definition of defect of the facility. They are 
10 just, in my opinion, used or should be used for just 
11 foul shooting, set shots only. Half court would be 
12 dangerous on that basket. 
13 Q Is that just based on a reasonable man's 
14 standard? In other words, a reasonable standard of 
15 care? 
16 A I would think so. Whether it's youth or 
17 whether it's adult, again, the better the skilled 
18 player, the — maybe — how can I say it? The better 
19 the skilled player, the more aware they are of the 
20 surrounding facilities because of their ability, but 
21 there's just not proper enough room, no matter how 
22 good they are, with that just being as close as it is 
23 to that backboard. 
24 Q Now, do you base that on any particular 
25 standards again or is that just your overall 
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1 lot more talent and coordination to play basketball 
2 well. 
3 Q Now, it sounds to me like the article 
4 you're referring to is, again, elementary age or 
5 perhaps junior high school age. 
6 A It was geared more for adults in teaching 
7 kids, youth, how to play the game. 
8 Q Okay. 
9 A And some of those same principles would 
10 apply to people who are teaching beginner classes, 
11 even if they're adults. 
12 Q Now, do you understand that Mr. Gomez had 
13 had the beginning basketball class once already? 
14 A I think I recall reading that, uh-huh. 
15 Q So this was the second time through the 
16 same class? 
17 A Okay. Yeah. 
18 Q So, again, the standards you're applying in 
19 I this case, are they based simply upon your general 
20 understanding of reasonableness? 
21 A Yeah. A general understanding through my 
22 experience at the time I was with the military and 
23 the time I've played of reasonable safety, and that 
24 there's much more needed room the lousier the 
25 player. We had some facilities in Korea, for 
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